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COMMENTS 
CoRPORATIONs-THE FmucIARY DuTY OF DIB:BcToRs IN THE Is-
suANcE OF STOCK SUBJECT TO PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS - In Gord v. 
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Iowana Farms Milk Co., 1 a stockholder protested the issue to the de-
fendant of certain shares of stock in a closely held corporation. At the 
time of the sale, the plaintiff was a director and secretary-treasurer of the 
corporation with access to the corporate books and knowledge of the 
corporate assets. At the meeting at which the stock was issued, the 
plaintiff signed a statement saying "at the present time I do not elect 
to purchase any stock. . . ."2 The stock, sold for $ I 5 a share, had a 
value variously estimated at $50 to $103.22. The plaintiff alleged that 
defendants as directors breached their fiduciary duty by not disclosing 
that the issuance price was substantially less than the reasonable value, 
and that the effect of the issuance would be to dilute the value of his 
holdings. The trial court dismissed the petition, noting that the plain-
tiff was an educated, skilled man, that plaintiff in his capacity as an 
officer and director knew all the facts on which he could make his own 
mathematical computation of the stock worth, and that there was no 
fraud or fraudulent concealment. On appeal, held, reversed. There 
was a breach of the fiduciary duty of the directors in failing to disclose 
the value of the stock and the diluting effect of such issuance. 
It is acknowledged that directors are £duciaries as to stock subject 
to preemptive rights.3 Thus when directors issue new stock to a minor-
ity fraction, giving the majority group no opportunity to subscribe, there 
is a clear breach of fiduciary duty,4 and the shareholder may use the 
traditional equitable remedies to enforce these obligations.5 The pur-
pose of this comment is to examine the nature of the director's duty 
in the issue of stock subject to preemptive right in the following areas: 
the issuance price, the notice to shareholders, the time limitations in 
exercising preemptive rights, and the disclosure of relevant facts. In 
addition, the effect of shareholder waiver or discharge, and of bad faith 
or fraud by the directors will be noted. 
I. Duty as to Issuance Price 
Obviously, directors cannot discriminate against shareholders by 
offering the stock to them at a price higher than that at which the same 
stock is later offered to the public. More obscure, however, are the 
1 (Iowa 1953) 60 N.W. (2d) 820. 
2Jd. at 824. 
3 Schmidt v. Pritchard, 135 Iowa 240, 112 N.W. 801 (1907). In some cases, the 
preemptive right is created essentially as a remedy when directors have breached their duty. 
Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 132 Kan. 129, 294 P. 859 (1931). 
4 Rowland v. Times Pub. Co., 160 Fla. 465, 35 S. (2d) 399 (1948). 
5 Adams, ''Remedy for Denial of the Stockholder's Preemptive Right," 6 N.Y. UNIV. 
lliTRA,."\WRAL L. REv. 126 (1951). 
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judicially imposed maximum and minimum limits on the issuance 
price of stock. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that sale of 
stock of a small closely held corporation at a price far below its value 
would be questionable even though preemptive rights are attached; a 
sale at such a materially decreased price was deemed "evidence of an 
oppressive scheme."6 But since shareholders get first opportunity to 
buy the new stock, it is difficult to see the "oppression." In those cor-
porations where the stock is widely enough traded that a sale of sub-
scription rights by the shareholder is possible, the shareholder has addi-
tional protection. A judicially imposed minimum sale price seems an 
unnecessary restriction on corporate action. 
There has been considerable divergence as to the establishment by 
the courts of a maximum on the sale price of stock subject to preemptive 
right, i.e., are holders of preemptive rights entitled to buy additional 
stock at par or may they be obliged to pay a ''bonus" for their shares? 
Michigan and Pennsylvania courts are on record as forcing the directors 
to sell stock to the holders of preemptive rights at par, the rationale 
given being a question-begging "right" in shareholders to subscribe at 
par, plus the alleged danger of "squeezing out'' the original sharehold-
ers. 7 Other courts have held that the shareholder has no preemptive 
"right" to purchase at par, the interest in the corporation to raise in-
creased funds plus the ability of the shareholder to sell his subscription 
rights being cited as reasons for the rule.8 This latter view is superior. 
There is a danger of some shareholders being unable to raise funds, but 
this problem exists to some degree in the issuance of additional stock 
at any price. Admittedly, even an ability to sell subscription rights is 
not complete protection because the shareholder loses his proportionate 
voting interest from the sale. But overbalancing this possible loss to a 
few shareholders is the economic advantage to the corporation and 
thereby to the whole body of shareholders in being able to raise addi-
tional funds and in being unhampered by an arbitrary par limit on the 
sale price of new stock. 
6 Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W. (2d) 620 (1946). It should be 
noted that the corporation involved was closely held, the stock value was difficult to appraise, 
and there was no great sale of subscription right. Moreover, the sale price was not deemed 
to be materially below par, so the above principle is dictum. 
7 Hammond v. Edison illuminating Co., 131 Mich. 79, 90 N.W. 1040 (1902); Cun-
ningham's Appeal, 108 Pa. 546 (1885). Pennsylvania also provides authority for the 
effect that a bonus, even though invalid, cannot be recovered once it is paid by the share-
holder. De La Cuesta v. Ins. Co. of North America, 136 Pa. 62, 658, 20 A. 505 (1890). 
8 Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906); McClanahan 
v. Heidelberg Brewing Co., 303 Ky. 739, 199 S.W. (2d) 127 (1947) (a Kentucky statute 
requiring full value for shares issued was used as a partial basis for the decision); Van 
Slyke v. Norris, 159 Minn. 63, 198 N.W. 409 (1924). 
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IL Duty to Provide Notice and Allow Reasonable Time to Subscribe 
In general the shareholder of stock having preemptive rights must 
be given the opportunity to subscribe. 9 This involves giving notice of 
the sale of new shares and allowing ample time for the shareholder to 
make application. 
It is not necessary that actual notice reach the shareholder, it being 
sufficient that the notice has a "reasonable" likelihood of arriving. The 
shareholder who by a journey puts himself beyond the power of the 
corporation to give notice cannot complain when a letter sent to the 
last address left with the corporation fails to reach him.10 It would be 
an intolerable burden to force the corporation to provide actual notice 
to all its shareholders of the impending issue. Accordingly, a standard 
of diligence is imposed on the shareholder to furnish his correct address 
to the corporation and to remain in contact with that address.11 
If the directors fail to allow a reasonable time for the shareholder 
to subscribe, it is a breach of their :fiduciary duty.12 Allowing only five 
days has been deemed unreasonable.13 Although as few as ten days 
have been deemed reasonable,14 thirty to sixty days are more frequently 
sustained as adequate. Such factors as the number of shareholders, 
the corporate need for immediate funds, and the ability of the share-
holder to communicate with the corporation are factors considered 
under the "reasonableness" test.15 However, in a New York case16 the 
9 Shareholders must always have this opportunity to subscribe in preference to out-
siders. An attempt to issue stock to the highest bidder under sealed bid was held invalid 
in Electric Co. of America v. Edison Electric illuminating Co., 200 Pa. 516, 50 A. 164 
(1901). 
10 Hoyt v. Great American Ins. Co., 201 App. Div. 352, 194 N.Y.S. 449 (1922). 
11 If the corporation could easily ascertain the correct address, and if the shares are 
still available, the shareholder may exercise his preemptive rights although he failed to sub-
scribe within the stated time limits because of failure to receive notice. James v. Buena 
Ventura Nitrate Grounds Syndicate, Ltd., [1896] 1 Ch. 456. This may be part of the 
general tendency to relax the shareholder standard of diligence where the stock is still 
available. See cases cited at note 18 infra. 
12 Discrimination through extending the time to one shareholder but not to others is a 
breach of duty. Tarlow v. Archbell, 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 3 (1943), affd. 296 N.Y. 757, 70 
N.E. (2d) 556 (1946). 
13 Bennett v. Baum, 90 Neb. 320, 133 N.W. 439 (1911); Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 
140, 16 N.W. 854 (1883) (11 days held unreasonable when the mail service took 18 days). 
14 Sommer v. Armor Gas & Oil Co., 71 Misc. 211, 128 N.Y.S. 382 (1911), affd. 207 
N.Y. 739, 101 N.E. 1122 (1913). The approval of 10 days was dictum in this case since 
the court determined that the tardy shareholder could recover so long as the stock was still 
unissued. 
15 If the notice specifies that the subscription must be made within a given period, 
this is interpreted to mean that only a binding acceptance, not payment, need be made 
within the time limits. Hart v. St. Charles Street R. Co., 30 La. Ann. Rep. 758 (1878). 
16 Dusenberry v. Sagamore Development Co., 164 App. Div. 573, 150 N.Y.S. 229 
(1914). 
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notice of issue of new stock was mailed October 26 and the date for 
acceptance was set at November I. After that date the stock was sold 
to an antagonistic group which thereby gained control of the corpora-
tion. The court did not consider the question of whether this was a 
reasonable time to subscribe but rather emphasized the fact that the 
shareholder was tardy in making his application. In rejecting his claim 
the court said: 
"This complaint was not of an opportunity denied, but rather 
of an opportunity overlooked, and the grievance does not seem to 
arise over a lost investment, but rather over the power of control 
over the corporation gained by others more vigilant."17 
The need for the corporation to obtain capital by disposing of shares 
of stock has caused the courts to impose a standard of diligence on the 
shareholder to act within the time limit. If the stock is not sold, how-
ever, the reason for the time limit disappears, and the tardy shareholder 
may still sue to purchase the stock. In other words, the failure of the 
shareholder to exercise his right within the specified time only bars him 
from contesting the sale of the stock to someone else.18 
III. Duty of Disclosure 
In any transaction between trustee and beneficiary, the trustee is 
obligated to show that he exercised the "utmost fairness," which ordi-
narily involves disclosure to the beneficiary of all relevant facts known 
to the trustee and any other conduct necessary to enable the beneficiary 
to decide intelligently upon a full consideration of the pertinent facts.19 
The superior position of the trustee in knowledge, skill, and influence 
is the basis for the rule.20 Applying this rule to corporation directors, 
11 Id. at 232. 
18 Sommer v. Armor Gas & Oil Co., 71 Misc. 211, 128 N.Y.S. 382 (1911); Oppen-
heimer v. Wm. F. Chiniquy Co., 335 ID. App. 190, 81 N.E. (2d) 260 (1948); 47 MICH. 
L. REv. 805 (1949). 
10 BoGBRT, HANDBOOK oF THE I.Aw oF TRUSTS, 3d ed., §96, p. 398 (1952). For 
application in the corporate field of the full disclosure standard, see Levy v. Pacific Eastern 
Corp., 153 Misc. 488, 275 N.Y.S. 291 (1934). 
20 It might be argued that there is a duty of loyalty which precludes the directors from 
purchasing the stock for themselves. See 1 TRUSTS REsTATI!MBNT §170, comment b 
(1935) where it is stated that " ••• A trustee with power to sell trust property is under a 
duty not to sell to himself either by private sale or at auction, whether the property has a 
market price or not, and whether or not the trustee makes a profit thereby." 
This doctrine has not been applied to the corporate director. If the shareholder fails 
to satisfy a reasonable standard of diligence, sale of the stock to the other directors is 
permitted. Van Slyke v. Norris, 159 Minn. 63, 198 N.W. 409 (1924) (shares finally sold 
to the directors after an attempt to sell to outsiders failed); Dusenberry v. Sagamore De-
velopment Co., 164 App. Div. 573, 150 N.Y.S. 229 (1914) (the president himself pur-
chased the shares and thereby gained control of the company). 
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the Iowa court in the principal case held that the failure to disclose 
the book value of the new stock and the diluting effect of the issuance 
was a breach of the fiduciary duty. It is submitted that such an appli-
cation in the area of corporate fiduciaries is unwarranted.21 Sharehold-
ers of listed stocks have access to financial statements from which they 
can easily estimate the value of stock.22 Moreover, for stock traded on 
an exchange, the market value is readily determinable. For unlisted 
stock, the required standard of full disclosure of book value may be 
of some value when the shareholder has no access to corporate financial 
statements.23 But when such information is available to the stockholder, 
as in the principal case where the plaintiff-shareholder was secretary-
treasurer of the corporation, there is no reason why the stockholder 
cannot compute his own estimate of value. Moreover, to force the cor-
poration to disclose book value may be misleading because book value 
often bears little relation to real stock worth. In certain types of corpo-
rations, e.g., merchandising concerns having a rapid turnover of inven-
tory, book value is practically worthless as a yardstick of stock worth. 
In brief, in those areas where only the directors have access to rele-
vant information, the requirement of full disclosure is warranted. But 
when the relevant facts are accessible to the shareholder and it only 
remains to estimate the stock's value based on these facts, it is difficult 
to see why the directors should assume the responsibility for making 
21 Conventional trust principles distinguish between cases where the beneficiary has 
given his consent to the transaction and cases where no consent has been given. In the 
latter case the trustee is under the following duty set forth in 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT 
§170 (1935), where it is stated: "(2) The trustee in dealing with the beneficiary on the 
trustee's own account is under a duty to the beneficiary to deal fairly with him and to 
communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction which the trustee 
knows or should know." 
Even if the beneficiary has given his consent, however, he may still hold the trustee 
liable, according to l TRUSTS REsTATEMilNT §216(2)(b) (1935), if " ... the beneficiary, 
when he gave his consent, did not know of his rights and of the material facts which the 
trustee knew or should have known and which the trustee did not reasonably believe that 
the beneficiary knew. • • ." ' 
Thus, in the event of consent, a reasonable belief that the beneficiary knew the 
material facts discharges the duty. In the principal case, the plaintiff gave his consent 
by signing a waiver and the other directors had a "reasonable" belief that the plaintiff 
would know the relevant facts. Thus, even under strict trust law, the decision of the 
Iowa Court was unjustified. 
22 Merely having access to the corporate books was not deemed sufficient disclosure in 
Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 A. 224 (1921), affd. 13 Del. Ch. 384, ll8 A. l 
(1922). 
23 When stock was offered to the highest bidder, and when the shareholder failed to 
bid because the corporate books were so incomplete and fragmentary that the real value 
could not be ascertained, it was not termed a waiver of preemptive right. Dunn v. Acme 
Auto & Garage Co., 168 Wis. 128, 169 N.W. 297 (1918). 
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such an estimate. 24 Such a requirement may provoke not only actions 
alleging breach of the fiduciary duty of a director but also unwarranted 
litigation based on misrepresentation. 
IV. Waiver or Discharge 
The shareholder's express refusal to buy additional stock relieves the 
directors from any further duty to sell to this shareholder.25 Even if 
the stock is still on hand a year later, the shareholder cannot revoke his 
waiver and purchase the stock.26 The principal case, however, holds 
that an express waiver containing no time limit may be revoked until 
a notice of the withdrawal of the preemptive right to purchase is given 
by the corporation. 
Under certain conditions, the courts will discharge the fiduciary of 
his duty by means of a "constructive waiver." Where no time limits are 
imposed on subscription, the shareholder may be held to have waived 
his right if he delays in purchasing the new stock while the corpora-
tion is in urgent need of funds and then demands his preemptive rights 
when the corporation's financial outlook improves. 27 Where the exer-
cise of a preemptive right would result in the breach of a contract not 
to acquire the majority of the stock, the courts find a "waiver" of pre-
emptive right.28 In general, the bad faith or fraud of the shareholder 
will discharge the duty of the directors to issue the stock to this share-
holder if it will work injury to the corporation. 
V. Bad Faith of the Director 
All of the above comments have been based on situations where 
no bad faith or fraud could be shown. Once actual bad faith on the 
part of the directors is shown, the standard of diligence imposed on the 
shareholder is removed. Thus a shareholder may collect damages for 
24 In the cases surveyed, only the principal case has implied that the value of the stock 
must be disclosed. The absence of litigation on this point would indicate that such dis-
closure has not been required. For a case where there was no disclosure of value and yet 
the shareholder was denied recovery under a reasonableness test, see Noble v. Great 
American Ins. Co., 235 N.Y. 589, 139 N.E. 746 (1923). 
25 Hoyt v. Shenango Valley Co., 207 Pa. 208, 56 A. 422 (1903). 
2s Hall v. Hall, 20 Ohio Cir. Dec. 826 (1908), affd. 79 Ohio St. 456, 87 N.E. 1136 
(1908). 
27 Seaman v. Ironwood Amusement Corp., 283 Mich. 220, 278 N.W. 51 (1938); 
Conklin v. United Construction & Supply Co., 166 App. Div. 284, 151 N.Y.S. 624 
(1915), affd. 219 N.Y. 555, ll4 N.E. 1063 (1916). 
2s Heylandt Sales Co. v. Welding Gas Products Co., 180 Tenn. 437, l 75 S.W. (2d) 
557 (1943). At times this general doctrine of shareholder bad faith is expressed in the 
"clean hands" requirement of equity. 
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his inability to exercise his preemptive rights even after a six year delay 
if the directors had originally acted in bad faith.29 A waiver by the 
shareholder may be ignored if the sale of stock is "tainted by fraud."30 
VI. Conclusion 
The duty of the director in the issuance of stock with preemptive 
rights is distinguishable from that of the ordinary trustee. A standard 
of diligence is imposed upon the beneficiary-shareholder, who must, 
for example, furnish notice of his address, remain in contact with this 
address, and subscribe within the specified time limits. In the absence 
of fraud or bad faith by the director, the courts should recognize that 
his duty is to the entire group of shareholders, and that too rigid a doc-
trine of trustee duty would enable a minority to block or delay the 
necessary action of increasing corporate capital. The creation of an 
overly strict duty of disclosure in the principal case represents an un-
fortunate departure from the general status of the law.31 
Howard M. Downs 
29 Strickler v. McElroy, 45 Pa. Super. 165 (1911); Morris v. Stevens, 178 Pa. 563, 36 
A. 151 (1897) (two years delay held no bar). 
30 Upton v. Southern Produce Co., 147 Va. 937, 133 S.E. 576 (1926). 
31 It is significant that the principal case awarded the plaintiff only the stock which 
remained unissued. The judgment might thus be reconciled with those decisions which 
relax the standard of diligence for shareholders when the stock remains unissued. Never-
theless, the reasoning and principles set forth in the case are subject to the criticism noted 
above. 
